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Media reports suggest that Michel Barnier has confidentially informed MEPs that Brexit talks are 
now “frozen”[1] and preparations on the continent for a no-deal Brexit are being accelerated. This is 
in stark contrast to official UK government documentation, which claims that “A scenario in which 
the UK leaves the EU without agreement (a ‘no deal’ scenario) remains unlikely given the mutual 
interests of the UK and the EU in securing a negotiated outcome”[2]. 
The latter appears to be an article of faith on the part of the UK government and represents at best a 
rather naïve misreading of the payoffs for each side. In game theoretic terms, the UK government 
appears to believe (and is behaving as if it believes) that it is engaged in a game of chicken. Whilst it 
is true that the UK is vastly more exposed to Brexit than most of Europe[3], it is also true that the 
economic losses for the EU from a no deal Brexit are likely to be substantial (see, for example, the 
work of the think-tank Oxford Economics Oxford Economics [4]). As such, there is surely a strong 
incentive to avoid such an outcome on both sides and the only reason for a “no deal” scenario to 
unfold is a miscalculation. There is thus zero incentive for the UK government to make any 
concessions prior to the last possible moment. 
As stated, I believe this fundamentally misreads the game. The EU is externally strong but internally 
weak. Many have noted that the EU is in a strong negotiating position, both because of its size and 
because the UK wishes to retain access to (and membership of) large parts of the European project. 
The EU is one of very few political actors large enough to be able to go toe-to-toe with Trump’s 
America and Xi Jinping’s China in international negotiations. Ironically, if it really did feel in a strong 
negotiating position then there would be no reason for the EU not to come to an accord with the UK. 
After all, the UK government appears to desire to remain within the Single Market for goods – which 
would also benefit the EU. The indivisibility of the Single Market is, according to this view, merely 
“dogma”[5]. The EU’s failure to offer the UK a satisfactory “deal” along these lines is, according to this 
view, evidence of a desire to “punish” the UK – a line taken by much of the Eurosceptic press in the 
UK. 
I argue, however, that this external strength masks dramatic internal weakness. After all, if the EU 
were really seen as such a valuable construct by all member states (and their populations), then 
there would be no reason to insist on the indivisibility of the Single Market. If everyone sees the 
value of the whole package then why not allow the UK to cherry-pick just parts of it? The reality, of 
course, is that large parts of the package are deeply unpopular in a number of member states. 
Large numbers of French and Italians have reservations about state-aid regulations (and, given 
widespread perceptions around their proclivity to find ways of avoiding such restrictions, these 
reservations appear to be shared by many within the state apparatus). Similarly, German trade 
integration for services is one of the lowest in the EU and much of Europe appears to have 
reservations around freedom of movement of people (but, of course, we all enjoy freedom of 
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movement for ourselves!) Indeed, it is a deep irony that the UK was one of only 3 countries to 
immediately grant EU citizens from Eastern European unfettered access to its labour market in 2004. 
The then leader of the German opposition – Angela Merkel – famously argued that even the 7 year 
period during which such migrants were denied full access to Germany’s labour market was not 
good enough[6]. 
Today, the EU faces a populist revolt on many fronts. Parts of the Italian government are deeply 
Eurosceptic and are openly defying Brussels’ desire for budgetary restraint. In France, Marine Le Pen 
(no friend of the European Union) won over 1/3 of the vote in the second round of France’s 2017 
presidential election. There are serious threats to the rule of law in both Poland and Hungary and 
even Sweden – long held up as a bastion of Nordic tolerance – is facing political uncertainty after the 
meteoric rise of the far-right. The populist forces represented by Brexit are not the exception: they 
are the rule. 
As a result, for better or for worse, these internal weaknesses mean that the EU is unable to concede 
on the integrity of the Single Market. After all, if it allowed the UK to carve out only those parts of 
the Single Market that it liked what incentive would Italy or France have to adhere to those parts of 
the Single Market that large parts of their populations are sceptical of? No wonder then that there is 
a consensus amongst many European leaders that a cliff edge (no deal) Brexit would be preferable 
to damaging the EU’s Single Market[1]. The EU is not playing chicken, its playing for survival. Unless 
they’re careful, the UK’s political leaders may take us to the cliff-edge and drive right over it. 
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As a result, for better or for worse, these internal weaknesses mean that the EU is unable to concede 
on the integrity of the Single Market. After all, if it allowed the UK to carve out only those parts of 
the Single Market that it liked what incentive would Italy or France have to adhere to those parts of 
the Single Market that large parts of their populations are sceptical of? 
No wonder then that there is a consensus amongst many European leaders that a cliff edge (no deal) 
Brexit would be preferable to damaging the EU’s Single Market[1]. 
 
 
 
 
